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It is often assumed that neural activity in face-responsive regions of
primate cortex correlates with conscious perception of faces.
However, whether such activity occurs without awareness is still
debated. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in
conjunction with a novel masked face priming paradigm, we
observed neural modulations that could not be attributed to
perceptual awareness. More speciﬁcally, we found reduced
activity in several classic face-processing regions, including the
‘‘fusiform face area,’’ ‘‘occipital face area,’’ and superior temporal
sulcus, when a face was preceded by a brieﬂy ﬂashed image of the
same face, relative to a different face, even when 2 images of the
same face differed. Importantly, unlike most previous studies,
which have minimized awareness by using conditions of in-
attention, the present results occurred when the stimuli (the
primes) were attended. By contrast, when primes were perceived
consciously, in a long-lag priming paradigm, we found repetition-
related activity increases in additional frontal and parietal regions.
These data not only demonstrate that fMRI activity in face-
responsive regions can be modulated independently of perceptual
awareness, but also document where such subliminal face-
processing occurs (i.e., restricted to face-responsive regions of
occipital and temporal cortex) and to what extent (i.e., independent
of the speciﬁc image).
Keywords: fMRI, fusiform face area, implicit memory, priming,
subliminal perception
Introduction
There is now considerable evidence that face processing
involves a circumscribed set of brain regions within occipito-
temporal cortex, as evidenced by single-cell recording in
primates (Perrett et al. 1982), intracranial recording in humans
(McCarthy et al. 1999) and neuropsychological deﬁcits such as
prosopagnosia (De Renzi 1986). Human functional imaging
studies have localized these face-sensitive regions to lateral
occipital cortex (LOC), superior temporal sulcus (STS) and,
more selectively, part of the middle fusiform gyrus, which has
been labeled the fusiform face area (FFA) (Kanwisher et al.
1997). Indeed, the FFA shows a high degree of domain
speciﬁcity (Grill-Spector et al. 2004; Tsao et al. 2006),
responding more strongly to faces than any other type of
stimulus yet found (Kanwisher 2006; Kanwisher and Yovel
2006).
Whether activity in such face-responsive regions always
correlates with the perceptual awareness of faces, however,
remains unclear. According to some, activity in the ventral
stream constitutes the neural correlate of visual consciousness
(Milner and Goodale 1995; Fang and He 2005). Accordingly,
several studies have found that brain activity in face-responsive
regions like the FFA shows a strong correlation with the
detection or identiﬁcation of faces under normal viewing
conditions (Grill-Spector et al. 2004), during binocular rivalry
(Tong et al. 1998), identiﬁcation of ambiguous ﬁgures
(Kleinschmidt et al. 1998) and the recognition of masked
objects (Bar and Biederman 1999). Moreover, the FFA is
responsive to the subjective experience of faces induced by
other objects (e.g., houses), rather than face stimuli per se
(Summerﬁeld et al. 2006). As a consequence, a common inter-
pretation of this literature is that neural activity in the FFA and
face awareness go hand-in-hand, such that face-selective
activity in FFA might be thought not to occur without
awareness of a face.
However, although perceptual awareness of faces may imply
modulation of neural activity in face-responsive regions,
modulation of neural activity in such regions may not imply
perceptual awareness. In other words, neural activity in these
regions may be necessary but not sufﬁcient for perceptual
awareness of faces. Moreover, it is possible that neural activity
in some of these face-responsive regions (e.g., FFA) implies
perceptual awareness of a face, but activity in others (e.g., OFA)
can occur without such awareness.
Some studies have reported FFA activity when attention is
drawn away from a face, such that it cannot be reported
anymore. For instance, residual FFA activity has been observed
for extinguished faces in neglect patients (Rees, Wojciulik,
et al. 2002) and, in normal participants, for unnoticed face
changes (Beck et al. 2001). Further functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) studies have found evidence for
greater FFA activity for faces than houses when they are
supposedly ignored (e.g., Henson and Mouchlianitis 2007).
However, others have not (e.g., Furey et al. 2006), and a
persistent problem is whether such manipulations of attention
are sufﬁciently strong to prevent limited or occasional
attention (and awareness) of ignored faces, for example,
whether the attentional ‘‘load’’ is high enough (Rees et al.
1999; Pessoa et al. 2002; Yi et al. 2004). A 2nd problem of
course is the difﬁculty in claiming no face-speciﬁc processing
of unattended stimuli, particularly given the variable sensitivity
of different fMRI analysis techniques (Haynes and Rees 2005).
Other studies have used the binocular rivalry paradigm,
where awareness for the unattended stimulus can be indicated
directly. Although activity for unperceived faces has been
found in the amygdala, in particular in relation to emotional
face processing (Pasley et al. 2004; Williams et al. 2004), activity
in the FFA is almost entirely eliminated (see Tong et al. 2006,
for a recent review). Indeed, studies have found increased
activity for faces relative to houses in the FFA for the attended
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et al. 1998; Pasley et al. 2004). One notable recent exception to
this view used continuous ﬂash suppression, which allows
longer suppression of unattended percepts. Although FFA
activity was drastically reduced for unattended faces (relative
to scrambled faces), it could still be reliably observed (Jiang and
He 2006). Interestingly, participants in this study showed no
evidence of being able discriminate real from scrambled faces
when suppressed, contrary to the general pattern from
standard rivarly experiments (Tong et al. 2006). However, it
remains unclear whether the residual FFA activity results from
longer processing of the unattended faces compared to
classical methods of binocular rivalry, or whether it reﬂects
the use of a different control stimuli (i.e., scrambled images
rather than houses), and thus a domain-general effect of object
recognition rather than face-processing per se.
Thus the data from attentional and rivalry paradigms are
mixed on the question of whether face-related activity in face-
responsive regions can occur without awareness. Importantly,
participants in such studies are distracted from perceiving
a stimulus that would be perfectly visible if attention was
drawn toward it. This aspect is crucial to recent neurobiolog-
ical accounts of consciousness, which assume that perception
without attention and perception without awareness (i.e.,
subliminal perception) involve qualitatively different processes
(Koch and Tsuchiya 2007; Kouider and Dehaene 2007):
Although subliminal stimuli genuinely induce unconscious
processing, perception without attention is closer to conscious
perception (Dehaene et al. 2006), if not a certain form of
‘‘phenomenal’’ conscious perception on its own (Block 2005;
Lamme 2006). The only study of which we are aware that
found face-speciﬁc FFA activity in the absence of awareness,
without using an obvious attentional manipulation, is that of
(Moutoussis and Zeki 2002). This study used binocular fusion,
in which 1 eye was shown a red face on a green background
whereas the other eye was shown a green face on a red
background, such that the overall perception was a yellow
color ﬁeld. We revisit this study in the Discussion.
An alternative paradigm that can render stimuli invisible, and
that is quite different from paradigms using attentional/
binocular manipulations, is the masked priming method
(Kouider and Dehaene 2007). In this paradigm, a stimulus
can be made difﬁcult if not impossible to perceive by
presenting it brieﬂy, preceded and succeeded by ‘‘forward’’
and ‘‘backward’’ pattern masks—so-called ‘‘sandwich masking.’’
Here, processing of a stimulus in the absence of awareness is
inferred from the effects of a masked prime stimulus on the
response to a subsequent same or different target stimulus,
even when the prime itself is invisible (see e.g., Fig. 1a).
Importantly, because the prime is in close spatial and temporal
proximity to the target, it will receive the same degree of
selective attention as the task-relevant target (Naccache et al.
2002). Another important advantage of this paradigm is that it
avoids potential confounds due to the use of different control
stimuli, because exactly the same stimuli are contrasted in the
primed and unprimed condition.
This paradigm has been used previously in conjunction with
fMRI to measure subliminal processing of words. Analogous to
the tight association between faces and the FFA, evidence
suggests a tight association between processing of legal
orthographic strings and the ‘‘visual words form area’’ (VWFA),
also in fusiform gyrus (Cohen et al. 2000; Cohen and Dehaene
2004). A reduction in VWFA activity, as well as in some other
occipito-temporal regions, has been found to accompany
masked word priming (Dehaene et al. 2001; Kouider et al.
2007). Furthermore, this reduction in VWFA activity is
unaffected by whether the prime and target are in the same
or different cases (e.g., radio--radio vs. radio--RADIO), implying
that this region achieves orthographic invariance in the
absence of awareness (Dehaene et al. 2001, 2004).
To investigate whether and to what extent face-processing
can occur without awareness we used a novel masked priming
paradigm similar to the one used for words, but optimized for
faces (Fig. 1a). To pre-empt, we ﬁnd that neural activity in
several ventral and lateral temporal regions, as measured by
fMRI, is modulated by the prime-target relationship, and that
this modulation cannot be explained by awareness of the
prime. All the classic face-responsive regions (i.e., FFA, OFA,
and STS) show this effect. Moreover, this modulation of activity,
at least in FFA and OFA, is not restricted to the same face image,
but generalizes across different photographs of the same
person; nor is it restricted to faces for which the participant
is pre-experimentally familiar. These data conﬁrm not only that
activity in face-responsive regions need not imply awareness of
a face, but also document where such processing can occur,
and to what extent.
Finally, we contrast these data from masked priming with
those from a long-lag priming, a paradigm using visible primes
and commonly employed in implicit memory research (Henson
2003). Data from the long-lag priming paradigm have revealed
reduced fusiform responses to primed faces relative to
unprimed faces, at least when the faces are familiar (Henson
et al. 2000). However, although such paradigms are used to
measure behavioral evidence of ‘‘implicit’’ (unconscious)
memory, by virtue of the fact that the instructions make no
reference to the primes at the time of presentation of the
targets, it is likely that imaging data from these paradigms
include effects of (incidental) conscious memory for the
primes (Naccache and Dehaene 2001; Henson 2003). We
therefore contrast fMRI data from this paradigm, when
participants consciously perceive both prime and target, with
those from the masked priming paradigm in which participants
have minimal awareness of the prime. We show that, unlike the
masked paradigm, the long-lag priming paradigm produces
repetition-related activity reductions that extend beyond
occipitotemporal cortex, in addition to repetition-related
increases in more dorsal regions.
Materials and Methods
Participants
A total of 16 right-handed British volunteers gave written consent to
participate in the study (8 female, mean age 23± 2 years). All volunteers
reported themselves to be in good health, with no history of
neurological illness. The study was approved by the Joint Ethics
Committee of the National Hospital and Institute of Neurology, London.
Experimental Protocols
Participants took part in 4 successive phases during the same day:
masked priming (3 fMRI sessions of ~10 min each), face-localizer
(1 fMRI session of ~7 min), long-lag priming (1 fMRI session of ~10 min)
and prime visibility measure (no fMRI acquisition). The entire protocol,
instruction and training included lasted about an hour.
During the masked priming phase (Fig. 1a), participants received 480
trials with the following structure: a ﬁxation cross for 500 ms, a 1st
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(backward) mask for 33 ms and ﬁnally the target face for 700 ms. The
participant’s task was to decide, as quickly as possible, whether the
target face belonged to a famous or nonfamous (unfamiliar) person,
whereas ignoring the preceding strange pictures of scrambled face
parts (i.e., the masks). We used this fame-judgment task because it has
been shown to produce large behavioral priming effects, at least for
famous faces (Ellis et al. 1990; Henson et al. 2002). Participants were
not informed about the presence of the primes. They indicated their
response with either their left or right index ﬁnger, counterbalanced
across participants. On each trial, prime faces were from either the
same person as the target (primed condition) or a different person
(‘‘unrelated’’ control condition). To avoid response congruity inter-
pretations (Damian 2001), the unrelated prime and the target were
always both famous or both unfamiliar (and of the same sex). To
investigate the level of unconscious processing of subliminal faces, we
also compared same-view repetitions (i.e., same person, same photo)
and cross-view repetitions (same person, different photo) (see Fig. 1b).
Thus, prime and target corresponded either to the same view (same-
view condition), to 2 different views of the same person (cross-view
condition) or to different persons (control condition).
Two sets (A and B) of 80 grayscale photographs of faces (half male,
half female; half famous; half unknown) were matched for image size,
and cropped to show face and hair only. Each participant received only
1 of the 2 sets of faces (set A or set B). This assignment was
counterbalanced across participants and allowed us measuring long-lag
priming in the long-lag phase (see below). There were 2 different
photos of each of the 80 faces, with no explicit control of the
differences across the 2 images of each face: The 2 photographs could
be taken from different perspectives (though the majority were
between frontal and three-quarters views), and involve different facial
expressions and/or differences in lighting conditions, or hairstyles.
The photos of the 80 persons appeared, across trials, in each of the 3
priming conditions, and as both a prime and a target (leading to 480
trials in total). The assignment of face images to conditions was thus
fully counterbalanced within participants. In addition, in order to avoid
potential behavioral or neural confounds related to the masks, each
target face was preceded by the same pair of forward and backward
masks across the 3 priming conditions. The 80 masks were created by
overlaying 4 upside-down faces (half famous, half female). Upside-down
faces were chosen because they constitute a better mask than
conventional noise masks (Lofﬂer et al. 2005), but they were overlaid
to avoid them from being perceived as a face and hence interfering
with the task performed on the targets. Brightness reduction (–30%)
was applied to the masks such that they would appear with the same
brightness as the original faces. In order to minimize pixel overlap with
the target face, the prime was scaled to be 80% smaller than the target
(masks received the same reduction for masking improvement
reasons).
In the 2nd phase of the experiment, face-responsive regions were
mapped in each participant by a separate localizer scan comparing
images of faces and scrambled faces. A new set of faces was used (half
familiar/half unfamiliar), and scrambled versions of these stimuli were
created by randomly permuting the Fourier phase information (see e.g.,
Eger et al. 2005). The contrast of faces versus scrambled faces therefore
controls for low-level visual differences, such as the spatial frequency
power spectrum (unlike a contrast of faces vs. houses). This contrast
also allowed us to isolate other ‘‘face-processing’’ regions (such as the
occipital face area, hereafter OFA), which other researchers have
argued are also ‘‘face-selective’’ (Rossion, Caldara, et al. 2003; Rossion,
Schiltz, et al. 2003; Steeves et al. 2006). Four conditions (familiar faces,
unfamiliar faces, scrambled familiar faces, scrambled unfamiliar faces)
were presented in a blocked design (12 stimuli/block, each presented
for 500 ms with 500 ms inter-stimulus interval, with 6 s of ﬁxation
baseline between blocks. Participants performed a 1-back repetition
detection task on the stimuli (with 2 stimulus repetitions occurring at
random positions within each block).
In the 3rd phase, we measured more conventional long-lag priming
using the same stimuli. This was in order to compare any subliminal
effects with the more established neural changes associated with
repetition of stimuli perceived consciously on their initial occurrence
(Henson 2003). Participants made a fame judgment on 160 trials
corresponding to 1 of the 2 views of the 80 persons from set A and the
80 persons from set B. For half the participants, faces from set A
appeared in the masked priming phase (primed condition), whereas
faces from set B did not (unprimed condition). Conversely, for the
Figure 1. Schematic description of the subliminal face priming method and behavioral results. (a) Each trial consisted in the sequential presentation of a ﬁxation cross, a forward
mask, a prime, a backward mask and the target. Participants were presented with familiar and unfamiliar faces and were instructed to perform a fame-judgment task on the
target. Masks were constructed from overlays of inverted faces. (b) Mean reaction times for the 6 priming conditions. The experiment involved a 2 3 3 factorial design including
famous and nonfamous target faces preceded by a prime that could depict the same person in the same view (same-view conditions), the same person in a different view (cross-
view conditions) or a different person (control condition). (c) Regression of priming on prime visibility. Each data point represents a participant. The regression functions (dotted
lines indicate 95% conﬁdence intervals) show the association between the global priming effect found for famous faces and prime visibility. Priming is interpreted as subliminal
when the curve representing the lowest value in the conﬁdence interval passes above the origin.
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faces from set A that were unprimed. This design allowed us to measure
long-lag repetition priming, although we could only compare same-
view repetitions vs. unprimed faces. Which of the 2 views was
presented during this test phase was also counterbalanced across
participants. Each trial consisted of a ﬁxation cross for 500 ms followed
by a target face for 700 ms for fame judgment. Otherwise, the
procedure was identical to the masking priming phase.
In the ﬁnal ‘‘prime visibility’’ phase, participants received stimulus
presentation conditions identical to the masked priming phase and had
to perform a forced-choice fame-judgment task now on the masked
primes rather than on the targets (64 trials). The only difference in the
composition of the trials was that, for half of them, the fame of the
prime and target faces differed, so that the fame of the target could not
be used to infer the fame of the prime. Participants were told that only
accuracy mattered and they were not scanned during this phase,
although they remained in the scanner to ensure that the visual
conditions of the prime visibility phase did not differ from the masked
priming phase (see Hannula et al. 2005) This measure was performed
after the masked priming phase (rather than before or during) in order
to avoid under-estimating visibility due to training and adaptation to the
display conditions (see e.g., Kouider and Dehaene 2007) and so that
participants need not be alerted the presence of primes prior to the
masked priming phase. They also received a practice session with 200
ms prime administered as many times as required to ensure that they
understood the prime visibility task. We analyzed the masked and long-
lag priming experiments in terms of reaction time (excluding fame-
judgment errors and trials with reaction times above 1000 ms).
Basic Analysis Strategy
The same basic analysis was performed on the reaction times, fMRI
whole-brain data and functional region of interest (fROI) signal change
estimates, and consisted of 2, 2 3 2 repeated-measures analyses of
variance (ANOVAs): The 1st one crossed familiarity (familiar vs.
unfamiliar) and repetition (unrelated vs. repeated, collapsing across
view, or ‘‘global priming’’). The 2nd ANOVA crossed familiarity with
view change (within vs. cross-view repetitions).
fMRI Acquisition
A 3-T Allegra system (Siemens) was used to acquire blood oxygenation
level--dependent (BOLD) gradient echoplanar images. For each volume,
we acquired 32 2-mm thick slices (64 3 64 3 3 3 3 mm pixels, time
echo = 30 ms) with a pitch of 30  up at the front in order to reduce
susceptibility artifacts in temporal cortices (Deichmann et al. 2003. The
repetition time was of 2080 ms in all 5 sessions. The 4th session (face-
localizer) comprised 185 volumes, whereas 285 volumes were acquired
during the other sessions.
Event-Related fMRI Analysis
After image reconstruction, the functional images were processed
using the SPM2 software (Wellcome Department of Cognitive
Neurology, London, UK). Five initial volumes were discarded to
eliminate nonequilibrium effects of magnetization. Images were
realigned (Friston et al. 1996), unwarped (Andersson et al. 2001),
normalized to the Montreal Neurological Institute template brain (3
mm voxel resampling) and spatially smoothed with an isotropic
Gaussian ﬁlter (8 mm full width half maximum). The time series for
each voxel was high-pass ﬁltered at 1/128 Hz. Statistics were computed
in 2 steps for both types of priming. First, a parameter estimate image
for each of the conditions (6 for masked priming and 4 for long-lag
priming) was computed by ﬁtting each voxel time series with a time
course created by convolving delta functions at the onset of each target
with a canonical hemodynamic response function (HRF) and its time
and dispersion derivatives (though this model captures the total neural
activity induced by the prime, masks and target, given the poor
temporal resolution of the BOLD response, any differences between
conditions must reﬂect the prime-target relationship, given that the
faces and masks were matched across conditions). In the 2nd step,
group-based statistical inferences were made using a random effect
model (Friston et al. 1999) and performing the ANOVAs described
above on the canonical HRF parameter estimate images of all
participants with voxel-wise P < 0.001 and a cluster extent of 20 or
more contiguous voxels.
Functional Localizer and fROI Analyses
For the face-localizer, preprocessing and 1st-level statistics were
analogous to the priming data, except that only a canonical HRF was
used for this block-based design. For each of the 16 participants, we
tested for regions showing more activation for real compared to
scrambled faces (at a voxel-wise threshold of P < 0.001, uncorrected)
and identiﬁed the coordinates of the peaks in bilateral occipital and
mid-fusiform cortex (OFA and FFA). Using the MarsBar software
(http://marsbar.sourceforge.net/), we deﬁned 8-mm spheres surround-
ing each peak and averaged percent signal change within these
participant-speciﬁc ROIs (the choice of a 8 mm radius was based on
previous experience of the likely spatial scale of activations in such
regions of interest).
Results
Behavioral Results
Subliminal Priming
We performed 2 orthogonal 2 3 2 ANOVAs (see ‘‘Materials and
Methods,’’Basicanalysisstrategy).Forthe1stANOVA,thefactors
were familiarity (familiar vs. unfamiliar) and ‘‘global priming’’
(unrelated vs. repeated, collapsing across view change). This
revealed a signiﬁcant interaction (F1,15 = 9.81, P < 0.01), with
greater priming for familiar than unfamiliar faces. The 2nd
ANOVA compared within- and cross-view priming conditions
and revealed no signiﬁcant differences (all Fs < 1), suggesting
that masked priming generalizes across view changes. Indeed,
planned comparisons showed that priming for familiar faces was
signiﬁcant for both same-view (F1,15 = 21.26, P < 0.0005) and
cross-view conditions (F1,15 = 20.76, P < 0.0005), whereas
priming for unfamiliar faces was only marginal for same-view
(F1,15 = 2.78, P = 0.12)and cross-view conditions (F1,15 = 4.52, P =
0.06). These results suggest that face repetition effects with
masked primes arehighlyreliableforfamiliarfaces, butsmalland
not reliable for unfamiliar faces, consistent with the literature on
masked word priming during lexical decision tasks (Forster
1998; Kouider and Dupoux 2001, 2005).
Visibility of the Masked Primes
Debrieﬁng participants before the prime visibility test revealed
that none of them noticed the presence of the prime stimuli,
nor did they notice repetitions of the same face or person
within a trial. The forced-choice fame-judgment task on the
primes conﬁrmed that our masking method rendered the
primes largely invisible, as performance was close to chance
(mean percentage correct = 52.3% (SD = 5.5), mean d# = 0.16
(SD = 0.25)). Although the mean d# measure of discriminability
was signiﬁcantly above zero (T(15) = 2.53, P < 0.05, 2-tailed),
crucially, priming was still reliable when the prime discrimi-
nation task was extrapolated to null performance (i.e., P <
0.005 for the intercept of the regression of priming against d#,
Fig. 1c) (see Greenwald et al. 1995; Hannula et al. 2005;
Kouider and Dupoux 2005 for justiﬁcation of this method).
Long-Lag Priming
For the long-lag priming phase (in which there was only 1
primed condition, i.e., same-view), a 2 3 2 ANOVA showed an
interaction between familiarity and priming (F1,15 = 43.15, P <
0.0001). In agreement with previous results using this task
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priming was found for familiar faces (82 ms; F1,15 = 45.50, P <
0.0001) but not for unfamiliar faces (4 ms; F < 1).
fMRI Whole-Brain Analyses
Subliminal Priming
The 1st ANOVA model (see Materials and Methods, Basic
analysis strategy) allowed us to identify regions showing
a global priming effect (i.e., a difference between unrelated
and repeated trials collapsing across view). Global priming
effects were found in several regions, though unlike
the behavioral data, no region showed a reliable
interaction between familiarity and priming. These regions
showing a subliminal priming effect were restricted to
occipitotemporal cortex, and all showed ‘‘repetition suppres-
sion’’ (Grill-Spector et al. 2006), that is, reduced responses to
repeated relative to control conditions (Fig. 2a). They included
a region in left, mid-fusiform gyrus (Fig. 2b), as well as a large
cluster extending from the LOC to the posterior middle
temporal gyrus (Table 1). In the right hemisphere, repetition
suppression was found in 3 lateral temporal regions, including
posterior middle temporal gyrus and superior temporal
gyrus STS. Surprisingly, no effect reached signiﬁcance in right
fusiform or ventral occipital cortices in this whole-brain
analysis (though see functional ROI analyses below). Moreover,
a 2nd analysis contrasting the 2 primed conditions (i.e.,
a difference between same- and cross-view repetitions) failed
to ﬁnd any regional differences, suggesting that repetition
suppression was not speciﬁc to 1 view of a face. We return to
these 2 points in the Discussion section.
Long-Lag Priming
The neuronal bases of long-lag priming differed from those of
subliminal priming in 3 major ways. First, long-lag priming led
to repetition suppression in several regions, but only for
familiar faces, mimicking the behavioral results and in accord
with past fMRI studies using this priming method (Henson et al.
2000; Henson et al. 2002, 2003). As there was no repetition
suppression for unfamiliar faces, we report below the results of
simple effects for familiar faces (note that all regions showing
repetition suppression we report below also showed a reliable
interaction between familiarity and priming). Repetition sup-
pression was found in left mid-fusiform gyrus and right LOC
(Fig. 2c). As can be seen on Figure 2b,c, the left fusiform region
found for subliminal priming overlapped with the one for long-
lag priming. Secondly, repetition suppression for familiar faces
extended beyond occipitotemporal cortex, occurring also in
lateral ventral prefrontal cortex bilaterally. Thirdly, priming was
not restricted to repetition suppression but also led to rep-
etition enhancement in an extensive set of regions, for both
familiar and unfamiliar faces (as conﬁrmed by the main effect of
priming, with no region showing a reliable interaction between
repetition enhancement and familiarity) (Fig. 2d). These
included large clusters in medial and bilateral inferior parietal,
bilateral frontopolar and dorsolateral prefrontal cortices,
precuneus, and posterior cingulate (see Table 1).
Functional Region of Interest Analyses in
Occipitotemporal Cortex
Although our preceding whole-brain analyses are useful to
detect differences in neural activity within common anatomical
locations across participants (to the extent that brains can be
matched on anatomy), they may obscure differences that are
functionally common across participants, but expressed in
anatomically different (or at least nonspatially overlapping)
regions. We therefore examined a subset of brain regions, FFA
and OFA, respectively, that were deﬁned in individual partic-
ipants by the face versus scrambled face contrast in our 2nd,
‘‘functional localizer’’ phase (Eger et al. 2005). When focusing
on fusiform and LOC, we managed to identify left and right FFA
in 15/16 participants, right OFA in 14/16 participants, and left
OFA in 13/16 participants. Differential levels of neural activity
for these 4 regions are depicted in Figure 3.
Subliminal Priming
For the subliminal conditions, region-speciﬁc ANOVAs revealed
a signiﬁcant global priming effect (i.e., collapsing across view)
in all 4 fROIs (all P s < 0.03), with no evidence of an interaction
with familiarity (all P s > 0.12). In the 2nd analysis of view
effects, no signiﬁcant difference was found between the
within- and cross-view conditions in any fROI, apart from
a marginal trend in the left OFA for greater repetition sup-
pression for the same-view condition (P = 0.06). Thus, contrary
to the preceding whole-brain analyses, priming effects were
found in fusiform and occipital regions of the right, as well as
left, hemisphere (suggesting perhaps greater anatomically
variability across participants in the right FFA/OFA). This
Figure 2. Cerebral bases of subliminal and long-lag priming. The neural activity
differences related to subliminal priming (a) led to repetition suppression only and
were restricted to occipitotemporal areas (in the FFA, MTG, and STS). For long-lag
priming, repetition suppression was found in the same FFA cluster, but it also
extended to ventral frontal cortex (b and c). Contrary to subliminal priming, long-lag
priming showed also repetition enhancement (d).
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functional--anatomical mapping across individuals (Friston and
Henson, 2006; Saxe et al. 2006).
An omnibus ANOVA that included all 4 fROIs (for those 13/16
participants for which all 4 regions were reliably located),
factorized by region, familiarity, and global priming, showed
a global priming effect (F1,12 = 8.93, P < 0.02) that did not
interact with familiarity, nor with region (all P s > 0.16). The
ANOVA on view effects likewise showed no same-view
advantage, nor an interaction with region or familiarity (all
F s < 1). Further post hoc comparisons, collapsing across
familiar/unfamiliar, conﬁrmed signiﬁcant priming for both
same-view (F1,12 = 6.86, P < 0.03) and cross-view conditions
(F1,12 = 5.54, P < 0.04). In sum, the left and right OFA and left
and right FFA showed the same general pattern: repetition
suppressionforsubliminalprimesregardlessoffamiliarityandview.
Even though the ability to discriminate the primes was small,
the behavioral results suggest that a few participants may have
been able to perceive at least a few primes during the
subsequent visibility test (Fig. 1c). In order to deal with this
possibility, we performed further linear regressions of each
participant’s global repetition suppression effect against their
d# measure of prime visibility, for each of the 4 occipitotem-
poral fROIs. There was no reliable relationship in any of the 4
target regions (all Ts < 1). Moreover, when extrapolated to
chance-level prime visibility, as we did for the behavioral
priming (see Behavioral Results), repetition suppression
remained signiﬁcant in 3 of the fROIs, and still marginally so
in the left FFA (all Ps < 0.07). Thus, the occipitotemporal
repetition suppression effects associated with masked face
priming in this study are likely to reﬂect genuinely subliminal
effects of repetition, supporting the idea that these ventral
regions are involved in an unconscious form of perceptual
processing.
Long-Lag Priming
For the long-lag manipulation, a similar omnibus ANOVA
including all 4 regions showed a marginal priming-by-familiarity
interaction (F1,12 = 4.43, P = 0.06), and a marginal priming effect
for familiar faces (F1,12 = 3.19, P < 0.10), but no reliable effect
for unfamiliar faces (F < 1.5). This pattern of repetition
suppression for familiar but not unfamiliar faces is consistent
with previous studies of long-lag priming (Henson et al. 2000,
2003). Again, no reliable interactions with region were found
(F < 1). Thus again, unlike the masked conditions, repetition
suppression in the long-lag conditions, like the behavioral
priming, appeared sensitive to face familiarity.
Discussion
Using a novel masked priming paradigm with faces, we
found evidence of repetition-related hemodynamic response
decreases (i.e., repetition suppression) in several regions of the
occipitotemporal cortex. Both whole-brain and individual fROI
analyses revealed repetition suppression in fusiform and
occipital regions (FFA and OFA) that are believed to play an
important role in face processing (e.g., Haxby et al. 2000).
These data provide evidence that face processing can occur in
face-processing regions within the ventral visual stream in the
absence of perceptual awareness. This is because repetition
suppression was obtained under conditions where most
participants failed to discriminate the masked primes, and
even when we took into account the possibility that some
participants were conscious of the primes, extrapolating the
BOLD data back to zero discriminability still left reliable
repetition suppression in most, if not all, of the fROIs.
Measures of Perceptual Awareness
Here, the absence of perceptual awareness was based on
participants’ difﬁculty in classifying whether the prime face
belonged to a famous person. We chose this fame-classiﬁcation
task to measure awareness because it is the same task (and trial
procedure) that was used to measure behavioral priming (and
therefore, constitutes a conservative test if participants had
access to the same information that supports their behavioral
priming). However, 1 potential caveat with this measure is that
participants may have had partial awareness of the prime
stimulus (e.g., awareness of face parts), which may have caused
the neural effects, even if such partial awareness was
insufﬁcient to support accurate fame-classiﬁcation. In other
words, it remains possible that our measure underestimated
Table 1
Results for masked and long-lag priming for the fMRI whole-brain analyses (n 5 16)
Condition Region Talairach
coordinates
Z score
xyz
Masked priming
Repetition suppression
collapsed across familiarity
Right superior temporal gyrus
and sulcus
59 40 19 4.35
56 40 10 3.87
Left LOC and posterior middle
temporal gyrus
45 72 9 4.25
50 55 6 4.11
56 64 6 4.06
Left mid-fusiform gyrus 36 50 10 4.17
Right superior temporal gyrus 48 28 18 3.91
Right posterior middle temporal
gyrus
48 69 20 3.75
53 72 12 3.50
Long-lag priming
Repetition suppression
for familiar faces
Right inferior frontal gyrus 33 29 9 5.57
42 32 2 4.26
Left mid-fusiform gyrus 39 -47 15 5.10
39 56 15 4.15
42 62 7 4.01
Left inferior frontal gyrus 36 26 6 4.90
39 21 7 3.94
Right lateral occipital 39 84 2 3.73
Repetition enhancement
collapsed across familiarity
Medial posterior parietal
and precuneus
18 66 25 5.30
3 68 42 5.10
9 59 53 4.72
Left frontopolar 42 53 3 4.48
Left inferior parietal lobule 45 50 47 4.24
53 59 36 3.22
Right frontopolar 27 59 11 4.08
21 60 25 3.93
15 64 2 3.57
Right dorsolateral prefrontal 45 28 37 4.02
39 20 43 3.80
Right inferior parietal lobule 48 51 38 3.91
48 45 27 3.86
33 51 36 3.43
Left dorsolateral prefrontal 38 31 37 3.89
30 37 34 3.57
30 13 35 3.41
Right inferior parietal 50 38 52 3.61
Posterior cingulate 3 30 35 3.56
3 30 40 3.48
Left superior parietal lobule 33 80 37 3.54
30 74 42 3.44
Note: Clusters that exceed an extend threshold of 20 voxels at P \ 0.001, uncorrected, are
reported.
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d Kouider et al.prime awareness (e.g., Kouider and Dupoux 2004) for
a discussion of the impact of partial awareness on masked prim-
ing]. To deal with this possibility, we ran another behavioral
version of this experiment on a new group of participants (N =
11), using the same masked priming method but now followed
by a 2-alternative forced-choice (2-AFC) task for the prime,
rather than a fame-judgment task. Each trial comprised the
same sequence of masks and stimuli as in the priming experi-
ment and, in addition, a pair of choices presented simulta-
neously after the target, 1 left of ﬁxation and the other right of
ﬁxation. One of the 2 alternatives always corresponded to the
prime, whereas the other was a different face. Participants
were asked to indicate which one corresponded to the prime
within the preceding event sequence, by pressing the left
button for the face on the left or the right button for the face
on the right. The 2 alternatives remained on the screen until
a response was made. Because the 2-AFC task can be performed
on the basis of face parts, it takes into account the potential
inﬂuence of partial awareness on priming (see Kouider et al.
2007 for a discussion on the beneﬁcial use of this type of 2-AFC
procedures). With this alternative measure of awareness, we
still observed the same pattern of results: Priming occurred for
both same and different view (both Ps < 0.0001) and to the
same extent (interaction: F < 1), and although d# was again
slightly above 0 and signiﬁcant (d# = 0.34; F1,10 = 14.58, P <
0.005), the same regression analysis showed that extrapolation
to null performance on the 2-AFC task led to a signiﬁcant
intercept of 19 ms (P < 0.0001) and no signiﬁcant correlation
between priming and prime awareness (T < 1). These
additional data provide further support for a genuinely sub-
liminal locus of the priming method used in this study.
Unconscious Face Processing, Attention, and the Ventral
Visual Stream
Previous research has provided 2 conﬂicting accounts on the
cerebral distinction between conscious and unconscious pro-
cesses. On the one hand, it has been claimed that the ventral
stream conveys visual consciousness, whereas unconscious
patterns of neural activity are to be found in parietal areas along
the dorsal stream and in subcortical pathways (Milner and
Goodale 1995; Ohman 2002; Pasley et al. 2004; Fang and He
2005; Tong et al. 2006). On the other hand, it has been
proposed that neural activity in the occipitotemporal cortex
can reﬂect unconscious analysis of visual stimuli (Rees,
Kreiman, et al. 2002). According to this latter account, activity
in the dorsal stream/parietal cortex reﬂects, along with late
synchronous activation of prefrontal and cingulate areas, the
cerebral basis of conscious processing (Dehaene and Naccache
2001; Rees, Kreiman, et al. 2002; Koivisto and Revonsuo 2003;
Gross et al. 2004; Koch 2004; Kouider et al. 2007). As explained
in the introduction, whereas the literature on visual word
recognition provides unequivocal support for the involvement
of occipitotemporal/fusiform regions during unconscious
perception, the literature on face recognition has not reached
the same conclusion. One possible reason for this discrepancy
rests on the fact that although studies using words relied on the
processing of attended stimuli and masked priming, those on
face processing focused primarily on the processing of un-
attended stimuli, and in particular on binocular rivalry. Yet, as
outlined in the Introduction, using conditions of inattention
poses 2 major problems.
Firstly, the unattended signal, particularly in binocular rivalry
paradigms, can be suppressed in precortical regions as early as
Figure 3. fMRI response in terms of % signal change for the subliminal and long-lag priming conditions in 4 occipitotemporal regions of interest. Note that zero-value of signal
change is arbitrary (only differences between conditions are estimated efﬁciently in this design).
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explain why it is usually totally suppressed in occipitotemporal
regions (Tong et al. 2006). One exception to this rule is the
recent study by (Jiang and He 2006) using the more promising
approach of combining continuous ﬂash suppression and
binocular rivalry. They found reduced but still reliable activity
in the right FFA. Nevertheless, Jiang and He compared the
processing of real versus scrambled images of faces, contrary to
other studies that compared faces versus other types of objects
(i.e., houses) and found no effect at all (e.g., Tong et al. 1998;
Pasley et al. 2004). This aspect is important because although
the FFA is more responsive to faces than other objects, it is also
more responsive to nonface objects (e.g., cars, houses, etc.)
than to nonobjects (e.g., texture patterns) (Grill-Spector et al.
2004). As a result, the residual activity found when comparing
face and nonobject stimuli cannot be taken as evidence for
unconscious face processing per se. In addition, as acknowl-
edged by the authors, the absence of attention might explain
why neural activity associated with recognition of (neutral)
faces was still reliable in the FFA but absent in STS. Because the
priming approach has the advantage of avoiding potential
confounds related to low-level differences with the baseline,
given that the same images of faces are used in the primed and
unprimed condition, our current data provide strong evidence
for face-speciﬁc unconscious perception in both the FFA and
STS. In addition, the fact that priming obtained even when the
view of the face (in the primed conditions) differed between
prime and target suggests that faces can be processed in the
ventral stream to some level of abstraction. Although some
previous studies have reported view-independent priming in
the FFA with visible primes (Pourtois et al. 2005), here we
show that this is the case even under conditions of invisibility.
This is consistent with previous subliminal priming fMRI
studies using words (Dehaene et al. 2001, 2004; Devlin et al.
2004; Nakamura et al. 2005; Kouider and Dehaene 2007;
Kouider et al. 2007).
Our results are consistent with a previous study by
Moutoussis and Zeki (2002), which relied on binocular fusion
instead of rivalry (Moutoussis and Zeki 2002). These authors
showed that presenting a picture of a red face on a green
background to 1 eye, and a picture of the same face in green on
a red background to the other eye, makes the face disappear
and leads instead to the perception of a uniform yellow ﬁeld.
Under such conditions of fusion, they found an increase in FFA
activity for invisible faces compared to invisible houses. As
discussed by these authors, the strong correlation usually found
between conscious face perception and FFA activity might
actually be restricted to binocular rivalry paradigm.
The 2nd problem associated with conditions of inattention
is that there are both empirical and theoretical reasons
why inattention should not be equated with invisibility. In-
deed, there is now mounting evidence that attention and
consciousness have distinct neural and functional properties
(Koch and Tsuchiya 2007), and that perception without
attention is qualitatively different from subliminal perception
(Kouider and Dehaene 2007). Indeed, perception without
attention has been deﬁned as ‘‘preconscious’’ (Dehaene et al.
2006), an intermediate state between subliminal processing
and conscious access, which has also been considered as
a certain form of (‘‘phenomenal’’) consciousness (Block 2005;
Lamme 2006). Thus an important advance of the present study
is that evidence for unconscious processing of faces was found
even when the critical stimulus (i.e., the prime) was invisible
but within the focus of attention (Naccache et al. 2002).
Because subliminal face priming was restricted to the
occipitotemporal cortex, our results argue against the claim
that unconscious processing of objects/faces is deserved solely
by dorsal and/or subcortical pathways (Milner and Goodale
1995; Fang and He 2005; Tong et al. 2006). More speciﬁcally, it
does not support an account according to which conscious
identiﬁcation of faces is directly related to activity in FFA (Grill-
Spector et al. 2004; Kanwisher and Yovel 2006). Although
neural activity in ventral steam might be necessary, it does not
appear to be a sufﬁcient condition for the perceptual aware-
ness of faces. It remains an open question whether the
perceptual awareness of faces arises from early activity and/
or local loops within occipito-temporal regions (Lamme 2003;
Zeki 2003) or rather through the later involvement of fronto-
parietal regions (Crick and Koch 1998; Rees, Kreiman, et al.
2002; Koch 2004). In favor of the latter account, both fMRI
(Lumer et al. 1998; Beck et al. 2001) and TransMagnetic
Stimulation (TMS) studies (Beck et al. 2006) have reported a
strong association between awareness of face changes and
dorsal areas in parietal cortex. Yet, as stated earlier, this type of
manipulation involves condition of inattention, which may not
be sufﬁcient to prevent any form of consciousness (Block 2005;
Lamme 2006).
Note that the strong relation between subliminal face
processing and occipitotemporal activity might hold only for
identiﬁcation tasks such as the fame decision task used in this
study. Indeed, it is plausible that the neural activity induced by
subliminal stimuli is not fully automatic but depends, at least to
some extent, on the conscious task and strategies adopted by
the participants (Dehaene and Naccache 2001; Kouider and
Dehaene 2007). Under this perspective, brain regions associ-
ated with subliminal face priming might vary, depending on the
‘‘automatization’’ of task-speciﬁc neural pathways. As a conse-
quence, with other tasks that are more likely to involve the
dorsal pathway (e.g., visuo-motor tasks), it is conceivable that
subliminal face priming will be found in dorsal regions. Support
for this hypothesis comes from a recent study by Nakamura
et al. (2006) who used TMS to disrupt the processing of
subliminal primes and found that behavioral priming can be
selectively eliminated: applied to middle temporal cortex, TMS
removed detectable priming in a recognition task, but crucially
not during a naming task. Conversely, TMS applied to the
inferior parietal lobe removed priming only in the naming task,
suggesting that the cerebral bases of subliminal priming are
task-speciﬁc, and that they can be found in the dorsal stream.
Subliminal versus Long-Lag Neural Priming
Although long-lag repetition priming effects are sometimes
taken to reﬂect an implicit/unconscious form of memory, their
neural correlates can be ‘‘contaminated’’ by explicit/conscious
memory processes, even if these do not necessarily affect the
concurrent behavioral measure of priming (see Henson 2003).
Indeed, it is often assumed that the implicit component of long-
lag priming is associated with repetition suppression whereas
the explicit component is associated with repetition enhance-
ment. Nevertheless, a direct veriﬁcation of this assumption is
currently lacking (though see Schott et al. 2005). Indeed,
a ‘‘pure’’ index of implicit priming, unconfounded by explicit
memory contamination, is difﬁcult to achieve (Shanks and St
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notable exception is priming under subliminal processing
conditions, as here, where the relation between the prime
and target cannot be explicitly established by the participant.
Consistent with the hypothesis that repetition suppression is
associated with implicit processing, we found that subliminal
priming was restricted to repetition suppression. Furthermore,
the present study showed that, whereas such repetition
suppression was conﬁned to occipitotemporal cortex for sub-
liminal priming, long-lag priming showed repetition suppres-
sion in both occipitotemporal and ventral prefrontal regions
(see Fig. 2). In addition, long-lag priming showed repetition
enhancement in a large set of parietal and dorsal--prefrontal
regions (see Fig. 2d). Consistent with the hypothesis that
repetition enhancement reﬂects explicit memory contamina-
tion in long-lag ‘‘priming’’ paradigms, these fronto-parietal
regions have been reported in several studies using explicit
memory tasks (e.g., Henson et al. 2002). In particular dorsal
regions (e.g., the posterior parietal cortex) have been more
recently argued to be directly associated with conscious
memory (Shannon and Buckner 2004; Wagner et al. 2005).
Note that we are not assuming here that repetition sup-
pression reﬂects the same neural mechanisms in masked/
subliminal paradigms as the more conventional long-lag/
implicit memory paradigms. Because the former results from
the processing of invisible stimuli, whereas the latter results
from the implicit processing of visible stimuli, the 2 probably
originate from different mechanisms. Indeed, the neural
response to masked stimuli has been shown to reﬂect an early
component in the feedforward sweep of object processing
(e.g., Super et al. 2001; Lamme 2003; Dehaene et al. 2006)
whereas, by contrast, repetition suppression in long-lag face
priming is believed to reﬂect later, possibly re-entrant activity
in the occipitotemporal cortex (Henson 2003). Different
mechanisms might also explain why repetition suppression in
the fROIs was found for both familiar and unfamiliar faces
under subliminal priming, but only for familiar faces in the long-
lag priming.
One unexpected results concerning our subliminal data is
the difference between the pattern of repetition suppression in
the fROI and the pattern of behavioral priming: as noted above,
repetition suppression did not differ for familiar and unfamiliar
faces, yet behavioral priming was signiﬁcantly larger for familiar
faces (indeed, only borderline for unfamiliar faces). One
possibility is that subliminal repetition suppression reﬂects
short-lived, visual representations of the prime that facilitate
perceptual processing of the subsequent target. For familiar
faces, this facilitation would speed the fame decision to the
target. For unfamiliar faces though, there may be a tendency for
any awareness of the facilitation itself (‘‘ease of processing’’) to
be falsely attributed to the target face being famous (cf. the
‘‘false fame effect’’; Jacoby et al. 1989). Thus, any speed-up due
to perceptual facilitation might be counteracted by interfer-
ence during the decision process, reducing the amount of
priming. Although an appealing hypothesis, this clearly requires
further investigation.
In conclusion, our ﬁndings show that unconscious face
perception can occur in face-responsive regions of the ventral
stream, at least when using a fame-classiﬁcation task, even
under conditions of spatial and temporal attention. Our data
therefore demonstrate that one can observe activity in face-
responsive regions related to invisible stimuli, and therefore
such activity need not to necessarily correlate with the
conscious perception of face stimuli. Understanding the
mechanisms that differentiate conscious and unconscious
processing in such ventral (or dorsal) visual-processing path-
ways remains and important question for future research.
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